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Liberal Democracy Will Revive Because There Is No Better Alternative: Part 2 of a Conversation With Francis Fukuyama
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Liberal Democracy Will Revive Because There Is No Better Alternative: Part 2 of a Conversation With Francis Fukuyama

But the end of history does not mean the end of the fight for the best governing system devised

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This is the second installment of a two-part, wide-ranging conversation with the great political scientist Francis Fukuyama, author of the recent memoir In the Realm of the Last Man. In Part II, he explains who Nietzsche’s “last man” is and why he’s making trouble for liberal democracy, defends his view that history has a direction, and argues that much of today’s politics, from MAGA to Germany’s far right, is a struggle for recognition. Catch up on Part I here.


Shikha Dalmia: Welcome back to Zooming In. I have here with me Frank Fukuyama for part two of our conversation. To fill in our listeners, we hadn’t planned this as a two-parter, but we had so much to talk about that we never even got to the news hook for our conversation, which was your new memoir, In the Realm of the Last Man, which is in some ways a sequel to your sensational first book, The End of History.

But just to recap: When we left off, we had been discussing how your break with the conservative establishment after the debacle of the Iraq War freed you to think thoughts that you perhaps hadn’t allowed yourself to think before. I had a similar experience after I quit the libertarian movement. Until then, you had more or less accepted the conservative orthodoxy that the central problem of politics is how to limit state power so that it doesn’t become tyrannical.

That’s ironic given how much conservative thinkers and outfits like the Claremont Institute went on to throw in their lot with a naked would-be tyrant like Trump. But setting that aside, you came to realize that the fundamental problem of politics was not how to limit the state, but how to build a functional state in the first place. That means moving beyond our tribal instincts and kinship-based arrangements that favor friends and families towards a strong, neutral, modern state capable of delivering justice and also public goods without favoritism. That transition is very hard and not every society manages it. But when one does, the natural human tendency towards what you call repatrimonialization never goes away. You noted this pull has been reasserting itself under Trump.



But the other big threat to the American experiment, in particular, is what you call vetocracy, which lets private interest groups stop the state from doing its job, including building things. But until all this happened, though, America had become such a successful polity, because in your mind it struck the right balance between the Jeffersonian project of circumscribing the state and the Hamiltonian project of building a strong but neutral central state.

So with that ground covered, we can finally go on to your news hook, your memoir, unless you want to say something more, Frank.

Francis Fukuyama: No, you summarized it very well.

Dalmia: The jacket of your book describes it as a “personal history as political history.” And you trace your own intellectual evolution alongside liberal democracy’s changing fortunes over the last century, and it’s woven with this very poignant history of your own.

It’s a pretty riveting account that moves across political philosophy, international relations, comparative politics, statecraft, and American history. And for all that it covers, it’s a very succinct, very readable 250-page book that I pretty much read in two sittings, which is remarkable. But before we get into the guts of it, if liberal democracy hadn’t taken such a nosedive over the last 15 years, would you have still written this memoir?

Fukuyama: Yeah, I think there were a lot of reasons for writing it. One was that to this day I still get several times a week comments about how I thought history ended, because there’s something in the newspapers. And I wanted to try one more time to clear that up.

“In a way, what worries me is that the pessimism about democracy can be something of a self-fulfilling prophecy. People have agency, and if they don’t believe that democracy is the future, then they’re not gonna go out and vote, and they’re not gonna support democratic institutions.” — Francis Fukuyama

But the second was really explaining this evolution towards thinking about the state and then thinking about American government in this regard, because it wasn’t so obvious from my scattered writings how this actually came about and how this was part of a coherent intellectual plan to think through some of the requirements for modern government.

Dalmia: Right. And you note that the last four or five chapters of The End of History was about how even though liberal democracy had won the struggle against communism, that does not mean that it cannot be challenged by previous regimes and previous ideologies. So in that sense, it wasn’t a triumphalist work. It was still a very sober reflection of the struggles that liberal democracy may face going forward. But your title of this book is In the Realm of the Last Man, and you seem to think that the last man is a big troublemaker for liberal democracy. So tell us, who is this last man and why is he causing so much trouble for us right now?

Fukuyama: Yeah, well, it could be a she as well. It could be a last woman …

Dalmia: Well, I would rather blame this on men, if that’s OK with you!

Fukuyama: Yeah, so the idea of the last man was from Friedrich Nietzsche, who hated the idea that history should end in a liberal state like that of England in the 19th century. He thought that liberalism, by tolerating different points of view, flattened the world. People couldn’t have strong opinions, and they couldn’t, moreover, aspire to higher things.

Because of the success of liberal democracy, you’d lead to a peaceful and prosperous world in which people would be content with that peace and prosperity. But Nietzsche felt very deeply that human beings are driven by pride. [There’s] a chapter called “Men Without Chests” about people that are just content with peace and prosperity. But they don’t have any striving towards any kind of transcendence, towards making themselves better, towards making their societies better. And he thought that that was the world that we were entering into.

Now it gets a little bit complicated. Leo Strauss gave a very, I think, perceptive lecture in 1941. He was a German Jew who had escaped Nazi Germany, and at the New School he gave a lecture on German nihilism. So Nietzsche is probably the single philosopher who is most responsible for formulating a kind of nihilism at the end of history, that the whole Western philosophical tradition that tried to understand the world in terms of human reason had basically failed. There are, as Foucault would put it, no “master narratives.” But in that world, anything goes in a certain sense. And that was the nihilism that Strauss was talking about, that liberalism had destroyed strong beliefs. And in that vacuum, because people did not want to be last men, they would insert other kinds of doctrines, including National Socialism. National Socialism is a strong god, it’s a strong set of beliefs, and it gives people something to strive for, and it takes this militaristic, aggressive form.



And I think Nietzsche was at least honest that if you wipe away the rational basis for a liberal society, the vacuum can be filled by anything, including things like fascism. I don’t think Nietzsche himself was a fascist or a Nazi supporter. The Nazis tried to claim his mantle, but they couldn’t really do that completely successfully. But he certainly made Nazism possible by declaring, for example, that God is dead, and if God is dead, then why not have a doctrine that says that the strong should rule the weak, and so forth.

So that’s really the problem of the last man. And I think in many respects, our extremist politics today is driven by people who don’t want to be last men. They want to make strong assertions of social justice, of a certain way of life. And so that’s where you get this revival of nationalism, you get a revival of religion, you get a revival of all of these pre-liberal beliefs, because people want to strive for something. And I think you see this both on the extreme right and on the extreme left.

Dalmia: But one of the things that liberal democracy does is, it lowers the horizon of politics, right? It is aiming for survival, mere survival and prosperity, not for higher causes. It’s not organizing society around any kind of a larger telos.

And that leaves people feeling a sense of meaninglessness and a searching, a longing for some higher striving. So in that sense, a liberal democracy that has succeeded—the peace and prosperity that liberal democracy offers—itself becomes an enemy of liberal democracy, because it leads to boredom. But your book still recounts a fair amount of the failures of liberalism: unwinnable wars, prosperity hasn’t been equitably shared, globalization has hollowed out the Western middle class.

So that leaves the reader wondering, what is it that is causing liberal democracy to be in trouble right now? Is it because it has succeeded too well and created the last man, or because it has failed and not really truly delivered on its promise of prosperity and justice?

Fukuyama: Well, I think that one thing we all have to wrestle with is why this right-wing populism has appeared at a moment where I think objectively the world has never been better. We have inflation, we have job loss, we have deindustrialization; all of these things are true. But compared to some of the circumstances in the past that brought about social revolutions, these are actually fairly minor things. You know, inflation was [in the double digits] in the 1970s. It goes up to 10% under Biden, comes down, it’s kind of settled at 4%, and people still think it’s way too high. And so I think there’s been this constant inflation of expectations as to what their economy should be doing for them, and therefore their government, because they blame every economic setback on the government.

“I think Nietzsche was at least honest that if you wipe away the rational basis for a liberal society, the vacuum can be filled by anything, including things like fascism.” — Francis Fukuyama

And I think that this is part of the—it’s kind of the problem of abundance, that people are leading pretty decent lives. All those guys that showed up on Jan. 6 had jobs and they’re occupied with this and that. But somehow it wasn’t enough. And I would say that was also true for all the students that are living in encampments on behalf of the Palestinians. Their situation is not like that of the Palestinians, but they want to be able to adopt a cause that gives their lives meaning. And so I think that is kind of an illustration of the way that this desire for struggle and risk manifests itself in the current world.

Dalmia: Let me push back on that a little bit. I mean, liberal democracy has delivered a great deal of progress. And I can see the right wing being described by the last man phenomenon. I’m having a harder time accepting that that is also what is motivating social justice politics on the left.

Social justice politics are motivated by prodding liberal democracy to deliver on its promise of universal rights, justice. And you can quibble about their causes. Some of them, in my mind, are OK and they are defensible, and some are not. But they are not particularistic. They are universalistic in their longings for social justice for everybody. So why should we not understand that phenomenon separately from what’s ailing the right?

Fukuyama: Well, I think that that’s appropriate. I think that nobody—I certainly would not complain about people saying, yes, there are many remaining inequalities in the world and we need to fix them. But a lot of the rhetoric around the current progressive left goes much deeper than that and says that this is an intrinsic characteristic of liberalism to produce these very unequal outcomes, and therefore the system as a whole needs to be corrected. Now, one thing that actually makes me think that we actually are at the end of history is that I’ve seen relatively few people on the left actually articulate what an alternative system that would accomplish social justice would actually look like.

The words “communism” and “socialism” don’t have the pejorative connotations that they did for my generation among young people. So people can say, “Yes, I want socialism.” But if you query them, “Do you really want the state to take over the means of production, to have no private sector, to really have a powerful party at the center directing things?” almost nobody believes that. They still want liberal individualism. They want to be allowed to do whatever they want. And so it is a very strange impulse to believe that the system itself is highly corrupt and rigged, but also to not really have a clear idea of what ought to replace it.

Dalmia: Couldn’t we understand that as their longing for a better form of liberal democracy?

Fukuyama: No, no, sure. I mean, a lot of people would want basically more of what we had. I mean, they’re basically social democrats, so they want more health care spending. We argued about this in the last episode, but I think the point at which it begins to depart from liberalism is when you want to put the state behind, let’s say, affirmative action, so that it is no longer a social problem, and it’s not a distributional problem of economic goods, but it’s really the state distributing social status, in terms of telling people and organizations that you must hire somebody of a certain gender or ethnic background or race, that sort of thing. And that really, I think, begins to depart from classical liberalism, and it could, as it develops, lead to other stronger uses of state power that I think really do begin to erode some of the freedoms that we associate with liberalism.

Dalmia: Yeah, look, I have my own issues with affirmative action and the way it has been conducted. One way to understand affirmative action is that the admission system in universities has never been perfect. In fact, the original sin of universities was legacy preferences. They were admitting rich and privileged people because they had access to these universities, whereas minority students were being frozen out by actual state power …

Fukuyama: Yeah, but these are all liberal complaints about the current system.

Dalmia: Right. And that’s my point. There’s a way of understanding even affirmative action as a continuation of the neutral liberal state.

Fukuyama: Well, look, I guess I agree with you to the extent that many of the abuses of power on the part of the left mostly happen in relatively narrow circles. So it happens in Hollywood, it happens in universities, where basically it’s kind of a mixture of vaguely state power, but mostly social pressure to say certain things. There are a number of statements I really don’t feel I can make that I believe are completely true on the Stanford campus, because there would be way too much pushback against it. And that could actually in many cases lead to people getting fired or sidelined or whatnot. So I do think that there is a real illiberal trend on the left, and it’s one that I think we have to be vigilant about.

Dalmia: Definitely. I don’t argue with that at all. Moving on again to the central focus of this conversation. You’ve changed your mind about a lot of things, as you note in your book. You had pretty much bought the neoconservative and the neoliberal orthodoxy of the conservative establishment in your previous life. But one thing you have not actually changed your mind about is the basic Hegelian notion of progress. Even in this book, you do believe that history is moving toward a rational endpoint where the fundamental contradictions of human nature are resolved in liberal democracy. But hasn’t the most recent wave of democratic backsliding given you some pause on that thesis? It’s not simply that weak democracies are backsliding; it is that strong democracies, as in America, Europe, and India, are backsliding into authoritarianism.



And so perhaps the ancients, Greek philosophers, were more correct when they said that regimes have a cyclical form, and the same regimes repeat themselves. And in the Hindu tradition, actually, there’s this idea about the cyclical nature of the cosmos. There are several stages that the world goes through. The final one is the time of decay, when the forces of evil overwhelm the forces of good and the world has to be destroyed and life begins again. So why are you certain about this Hegelian history?

Fukuyama: Well, look, I’ve spent a lot of my academic career looking at issues of economic and political development, and I’ve spent a lot of time in poor countries. I would say that anyone that doesn’t believe that there is such a thing as development, progress, history should try to go live in Guatemala for a while, or in Myanmar, or in a whole variety of sub-Saharan African countries, and tell me if you don’t think that there’s a difference between living in those societies and living in Europe, Japan, Korea, the United States, Canada. There’s a huge difference. You still have countries in which women have no role in the economy, in which you still have basic social structures that are completely repressive of any kind of difference.

It’s that distance from contemporary developing countries and modern ones that constitutes history. Now, [Alexandre] Kojève himself, and I think everybody else that’s looked at it, would say this is not a linear process, right? It’s not as if every year we make progress and things get better and better. So we’ve had huge setbacks. We had a much bigger setback than the current one in the 1930s, when you had communism and fascism as competing ideologies. I don’t know if you remember, but in the 1970s, during the oil crisis and stagflation, you had Jean-François Revel saying, can democracy really survive all of this? And in the end, you have ups and downs, but the general pattern is upwards.

I think particularly at this moment, it’s pretty clear that people don’t like populist nationalism in many countries. You’ve had this whole sequence of elections beginning with Poland three years ago, Hungary earlier this year, Serbia, Brazil, now the United States, in which voters have really rejected this shift to the right. In a way, what worries me is that the pessimism about democracy can be something of a self-fulfilling prophecy. People have agency, and if they don’t believe that democracy is the future, then they’re not gonna go out and vote, and they’re not gonna support democratic institutions.

And like I said, I really don’t see people flocking to the alternatives. There are real alternatives in the world. If you’re a poor person trying to get out of poverty, you could go to Iran, you could go to Russia, you could go to China. You could go to North Korea—well, I don’t know, the North Koreans probably wouldn’t let you in. But there are a lot of places, alternatives where you could try to get your family to, but nobody wants to go to those places. They all know that there is such a thing as modernization, development, and those are the kinds of places they want to raise their children in.

Dalmia: No quarrel there. We wouldn’t be doing what we are doing if we didn’t think liberal democracy was a superior form of governance. The issue only is whether it is inevitable.

Fukuyama: Well, no, but who said it was inevitable? I said this explicitly in The End of History and the Last Man. I mean, there’s certain mechanisms that tend to push history in a certain direction. And the single most important one is technology, right? That you cannot have a high-tech society that increases productivity on a regular basis if you don’t have a scientific establishment, if you don’t have institutions that promote research, learning, and then the diffusion of that learning across the whole society. And as long as those remain in place, just the competitive nature of the international system is going to force people to adopt the same social institutions that produce that kind of progress.

“I think that one thing we all have to wrestle with is why this right-wing populism has appeared at a moment where I think objectively the world has never been better.” — Francis Fukuyama

You see that with China. I mean, China is not converging on liberal democracy, but in every other respect, Chinese society looks much closer to European society than it did 50 years ago. You have educated people, they expect a certain degree of personal freedom, they have consumer tastes, they make choices for themselves, and they have to be educated.

So I think that’s really what constitutes the historical process and kind of makes you believe that it is a directional process. Now, there’s a whole bunch of questions surrounding technology that I’ve also talked about in various of my books. In the early 2000s, I worried a lot about biotechnology, because our current liberal understanding of human rights really depends on a certain understanding of human nature. And if you could deliberately begin to manipulate human nature, you would manipulate that understanding of rights.

I think that the AI revolution similarly raises some very, very fundamental questions about human dignity, about the value of human labor. I think our friend Yascha Mounk has written actually a really good book about the impact of AI on democracy. And he’s actually quite pessimistic, because the basic bargain in most liberal democracies is that people are given work that gives them dignity and makes them participants in a democratic political system, but we now have a technology that threatens to undermine all of that. And can liberal democracy survive that? I think it’s not clear what the answer is. But I do think that, by and large, there has been this historical process driven by technological change that is the basic thing that gives history a directionality.

Dalmia: OK. So sticking with the idea of the directionality of history, which would suggest that even if liberal democracy is not inevitable, there is something that is moving us towards it. And that process may be aborted, but it is always guiding and pushing us in the direction.

But there is another view of liberal democracy just being a complete accident of history, that it didn’t have to happen. Jonah Goldberg wrote a pretty good book on this called Suicide of the West. And his basic story is that liberal democracy was born sort of in England, which was an island state sheltered from the wars in continental Europe, which allowed England to limit the power of monarchs and move towards the Magna Carta and the rights of individuals. And this entire struggle finally led to the Enlightenment, which then got transported to America. But none of this was inevitable. None of this had to happen.

Fukuyama: Well, this is the same argument that Daron Acemoglu and Jim Robinson make in a number of their books, especially The Narrow [Corridor]. They say if it hadn’t been for the English victory over the Spanish Armada, Europe would not have modernized. So there’s plenty of historical contingency.

But I think that if you look at human evolution over a longer period of time, you realize that there is a certain logic towards the evolution of certain social forms, just as there was in the case of biological evolution. So, for example, the eye was not an accidental thing that comes about in one particular species that manages to develop photosensitive cells. It actually developed in several different genetic lines over very long periods of time, because eyes are very useful. And so just the purely random reshuffling of genes every generation led to selection for those forms that are the most functional.



And I think something like that goes on in human social evolution, right? So we go through a whole series of stages where basically everybody in the world has the same kind of political system. So you go through hunter-gatherer societies, where everybody is a relative, in groups of 40 to 50 individuals at most. This is succeeded by what anthropologists call segmentary lineages, what other people would call tribal societies, where it’s descent from a common ancestor and ancestor worship that organizes societies. Then you get state-level societies appearing, and they don’t happen in one place and then get transported everywhere. They develop simultaneously in the New World, in Egypt, in Mesopotamia, in China, because, again, there’s a certain social logic. State-level societies can defeat tribal societies in power terms.

And so I think that if you take this sufficiently long-term view, you kind of realize that there is a broader logic to human social development. Accidents are important in explaining why a certain functional social form arises at a particular time and geographical place. But the world’s a big place, and if it’s really a functional adaptation, it’s going to be adopted by other societies in other times. And so that’s why I don’t really buy this accident—this narrow path argument.

Dalmia: You know, we’ve gone through about an hour-and-a-half-long conversation, and you have not yet brought up the word thymos, which you’ve popularized. And so I want you to talk about that. You understand our current moment as a politics of recognition, that it is ultimately about the need for human beings to satisfy certain urges of pride, which the ancients talked about. So tell us about thymos, and then I’ve got a question for you after that.

Fukuyama: Yeah, well, thymos comes up in Plato’s Republic. It’s a third part of the soul that seeks the approval of other human beings and not necessarily the satisfaction of material desires. So I’m not the one that formulated this. Hegel saw recognition as central to his theory of history, that most struggles in history were actually struggles over recognition rather than simply struggles over material goods. And I think that this pretty clearly explains a lot of our politics.

One example that I think illustrates this is the whole fight over gay marriage that we’ve gone through over the last couple of generations. So if gay marriage were simply a matter of economic well-being, that gay couples wanted to have legal means for inheritance and survivorship and this sort of thing, you could have done this through civil unions. But that was never enough for the activists that were pushing for gay marriage, because it’s a matter of thymos, it’s a matter of pride, that gay couples wanted society to affirm that their unions were every bit as legitimate and as valued as those between men and women. And that was really what I think drove that struggle. A lot of identity politics is really about that, about not so much overt economic or political discrimination against groups, but over relative status, and the fact that certain groups don’t have the kind of status.

So another, just to illustrate this with another historical example: Ralph Ellison wrote Invisible Man about African Americans moving from the Deep South to northern cities. And his point was that in the North, you had abolished legal segregation, but you still had social disparities that were reinforced by the fact that most Black people were invisible to white people; that they didn’t regard them really as other human beings, and therefore maintained a social hierarchy not based on legal structures like separate schools and so forth in the South, but really based on the invisibility of Black people to white people. And again, this is all about recognition.

“The basic bargain in most liberal democracies is that people are given work that gives them dignity and makes them participants in a democratic political system, but we now have a technology that threatens to undermine all of that. And can liberal democracy survive that?” — Francis Fukuyama

I think that a lot of the MAGA complaint about the United States is also about recognition. Most MAGA people are not starving. They’re not desperately poor indigenous people that have been frozen out of the American economy. What they suffer from is basically a lack of status, that educated people living in big cities don’t see them really as fellow human beings. They have different cultural tastes. In fact, Trump figured this out very early on. Ultimate Fighting Championship, or UFC, is something that no college-educated person goes to, right? But people in Trump’s base do. And I suspect that many college-educated people looking at a cage fight say, “Yuck, what kind of person goes to a sporting event like this?” But that kind of illustrates the lack of recognition that was all summed up in Hillary Clinton’s statement about the “basket of deplorables.” So I think in this country, it’s also a question of recognition much less than material deprivation.

Final example I’ll give you. I spent a week talking about my book in Germany, and the AfD had just won a couple of regional elections there, and people were quite worried about this. But if you look under the surface of what’s driving AfD voters, they’re almost all people that lived in former East Germany. And West Germany spent a huge amount of money trying to equalize outcomes in East Germany after unification. They extended their welfare system; all of the benefits that West Germans got, East Germans would get; they equalized the currency. So they spent a ton of money for economic equality, but there still remains social inequality, and so there is a subtle discrimination against people from the East that shows up in things that I wasn’t aware of. So, for example, most educated West Germans can speak English quite well. Educated East Germans do not speak English, right? Or they’ve got regional accents.

So this is not about material deprivation. It’s really about a kind of attitude of superiority that West Germans had over East Germans. And a lot of that produces the resentment that then leads to the rise of a group like the AfD.

Dalmia: You know, I sometimes think that instead of writing Clash of Civilizations, Samuel Huntington should have written a “clash of thymoses,” because there are different bids for thymos here. So the dominant groups want their thymos recognized by hanging on to their current status as authentic …

Fukuyama: Yeah, well, nationalist politics is all about thymos, right?

Dalmia: And at the same time, those who have been historically marginalized launched their own politics of recognition movements. But these movements have very different ideological implications for what the liberal polity should do. And to me it seems like it’s the politics of, actually, megalothymia, which is that each side is trying to be the dominant side.

And liberal democracy somehow has to arbitrate between these competing visions of thymos and come to some kind of a resolution. Do you think liberal democracy is capable of arbitrating this? What would the final outcome look like, where you have—to keep in the thymotic vocabulary—isothymia, where everybody is equally recognized?

Fukuyama: Yeah, well, there may be a generational phenomenon going on here, where people kind of forget about the conditions of social conflict or dictatorship that produced the demand for equal recognition in the first place. People don’t like living under dictatorships, but as you get out of the dictatorship and you live in a peaceful liberal democracy, you begin to take that peace and prosperity for granted, and then you begin to aspire to other things. And so you can think, well, yeah, communism was bad, but the EU bureaucracy is worse because I have to label my cheese in a certain way. So I think there’s that going on. I think that’s also why young people tend to be attracted to these more extremist ideologies more readily, because they simply didn’t have the experience of the real alternatives of living in an illiberal society.

Dalmia: Yeah, Benjamin Constant talked about the problem of forgetting, that you go on to old forms of governance because you forget how bad they were, once you’ve got some stability, and you lose interest in governing your polity and participating in it as well.



So I come to my last question. I mean, your book, even though it sees liberal democracy as directionally where the world is going, you also point out some very fundamental intrinsic problems in liberal democracy. And there were two of them: fetish for proceduralism, and the other was—and you’ve touched upon this a little while ago—on how the whole emphasis on agency, individual agency and autonomy, means that people ultimately try and escape even the constraints of human nature. And that leads to all kinds of pathological politics.

So if there are such intrinsic problems in liberal democracy, is there a better form of government imaginable in that case? So maybe liberal democracy is not the endpoint of history; something else better than that might come along.

Fukuyama: Yeah, well, these problems I think are real ones, but the question is, what is the alternative? Right now, the alternative to excessive proceduralism is just a return to dictatorship, right? So Bukele in El Salvador has got this big crime problem because of the rights of defendants and a slow judicial system, so he just jails everybody without any kind of due process. I mean, that’s his solution. I think it’s a serious question whether democracies are going to be able to scale back some of the incredible burdens of proceduralism that they placed on themselves.

I think that that’s an ongoing fight. That’s what the abundance movement is about, is to try to roll back some of that stuff while remaining in a liberal democratic framework. The other problem about the limits of autonomy are much more complex, because in some sense we don’t know what those limits appropriately are.

People have been enhancing themselves continuously using technology, and at what point do those enhancements begin to cut away at what I called in one of my books Factor X? There’s a certain human set of characteristics and faculties that makes us uniquely human and gives us dignity. And if you start messing with that, do you not change your understanding of what deserves recognition and dignity? This is going to come up in a big way with artificial intelligence, because you already have people arguing that machines can become conscious, that they can have feelings. Certainly the better LLMs mimic having feelings. But whether that’s possible—I think these new technologies have actually re-raised some of these fundamental philosophical questions in big ways, and it’ll be interesting to see how that develops over time. But again, I don’t think you can take for granted some of the theoretical bases on which we’ve understood liberalism in light of these developments.

Dalmia: This was a pleasure, Frank. Thank you so much for finding the time.

Fukuyama: Yeah, thank you, Shikha. Great conversation.

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