Brazil Rejects Trump’s Bullying and Convicts His Ally Bolsonaro for Insurrection
It is beginning to regard the U.S. as a threat to its sovereignty and is strengthening ties with China
Brazilian former President Jair Bolsonaro has been convicted by a Supreme Court panel for perpetrating a coup to stay in office after losing the 2022 election. Bolsonaro, an ally of U.S. President Donald Trump, was found guilty by four of the five justices on the panel on all five counts related to his efforts from 2021 to 2023 to overthrow Brazil’s democratically elected government—including plans to assassinate current President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and Supreme Court Justice Alexandre de Moraes—and sentenced to 27 years in prison.
The Supreme Court’s verdict, the only time a former Brazilian president has been convicted of a coup, a stunning first in a country that has endured over a dozen coup attempts since the late 19th century, has the potential to reshape the course of Brazilian democracy and redefine its relationship with the U.S. That is perhaps understandable given the two countries’ radically divergent responses toward their respective insurrectionists—the U.S., after all, rewarded Trump with another presidential term, while Brazil sentenced Bolsonaro to prison.
After the verdict, the Trump administration warned that there would be consequences for Brazil. In response, Lula vowed to defend Brazilian sovereignty in the face of U.S. pressure.
Trump’s vocal support for Bolsonaro, and his punitive stance toward the government that replaced him, has threatened to destabilize the 200-year partnership between the Western Hemisphere’s two largest democracies. It is also the kind of rift that would push Brazil to further strengthen its trade and diplomatic ties with China, which is increasingly, and ironically, being viewed as a guardian of its sovereignty and democracy in contrast to America. Unless Washington reverses course, America will cede market share and influence in Brazil to its rival. In essence, Trump is undermining America’s interests to advance his own ideology.
Bracing for Bolsonaro
In 2021, I wrote my master’s dissertation on how Presidents Trump and Bolsonaro each used disinformation to undermine trust in elections. At the time, after Jan. 6 and ahead of Brazil’s 2022 election, I questioned whether Brazil’s fragile institutions could withstand Bolsonaro’s attacks. While a measure of democratic order had been restored in the United States—Trump was impeached for inciting an insurrection in order to overturn the 2020 election, and Joe Biden, the election’s winner, was inaugurated into office—there was no guarantee Brazil would follow the same path.
But Bolsonaro’s attempts to provoke a military takeover of Brazil’s government with him at the helm by having his supporters storm the National Congress, the Supreme Court, and the presidential Planalto Palace in Brasilia on Jan. 8, 2023, were thwarted. Brazil’s institutions stood firm and President Lula, the rightful winner of the 2022 election, remained in office.
That outcome was due, in part, to U.S. influence. In the leadup to the election, the Biden administration quietly engaged with Brazilian political and military leaders, urging them to respect the democratic process regardless of which candidate prevailed. This approach was deliberately nonpartisan. Washington sought to preserve a stable U.S.-Brazil relationship—one historically grounded in a shared commitment to democracy and the will to cooperate despite ideological differences. But Trump’s reemergence in U.S. politics, along with his public support for Bolsonaro and contempt for the democratically-elected administration that replaced him, has jeopardized that relationship.
Trump Is Fueling Bolsonaro’s Base
In July, Trump sent a letter to Lula denouncing the “grave injustices” that Trump believes his “regime” has committed against Bolsonaro, whose trial he called a “Witch Hunt.” He then slapped a 50% tariff on Brazilian goods, even though the U.S. runs a trade surplus with Brazil. A week later, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio revoked the visas of several Brazilian Supreme Court justices involved in Bolsonaro’s trial. Brazilian leaders are now bracing for potential new sanctions. The real goal? To rattle Brazilian institutions and energize Bolsonaro’s base. Trump has embraced at the state level a version of Elon Musk’s strategy to destabilize Brazilian politics and boost the undemocratic, reactionary right in the country. Musk last year publicly bemoaned the alleged injustices committed by de Moraes and other Brazilian authorities in an effort to defend Bolsonaro and his supporters, who happen to be Musk’s—and Trump’s—ideological allies.
Bolsonaro’s conviction is a massive setback for the duo’s agenda for now. That doesn’t mean Bolsonaro’s political future is settled. Breaking with his colleagues, one justice, Luiz Fux voted to acquit Bolsonaro, expressing concern that the case was not considered by all 11 Supreme Court justices, and criticized the limited time given to the defense to review the evidence. His decision paves the way for a contentious appeals process that will likely push a final ruling closer to the 2026 presidential election. Brazil’s Congress, where center-right and right-wing parties hold a majority, is currently debating an amnesty bill that would absolve Bolsonaro and others implicated in the Jan. 8 attacks. Even if Bolsonaro’s appeals fail, he could seek asylum—for example, in Argentina—and, if successful, continue to exert influence over Brazilian politics remotely. After all, he’s exiled himself to avoid accountability once before.
Trump’s tariffs failed to intimidate Brazil’s Supreme Court, but they’ve sent a clear message to his supporters: he is willing to use U.S. power to protect allies and pressure opponents, even if it means undermining foreign courts and imposing punishing tariffs. This has galvanized Brazil’s populist right. Bolsonaro’s base, emboldened by Trump, has taken to the streets, calling for the impeachment of Justice de Moraes and President Lula. On Sept. 7, as Brazil celebrated Independence Day, Lula paraded through the streets of Brasilia, while over 50,000 Bolsonaristas marched in São Paulo, prominently displaying a large U.S. flag and demanding amnesty for the former president.
Trump’s efforts, and Musk’s before him, to push Brazil back into Bolsonaro’s arms stem from the MAGA movement’s vision of a trans-national right-wing populist movement led by the U.S., as was articulated by Steve Bannon at the Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC) earlier this year. Among the speakers at CPAC was Bolsonaro’s son, Eduardo Bolsonaro, who has been busy lobbying Trump allies to sanction Brazil. At CPAC, he openly called for the Trump administration to back the “January 8 guys”—as Trump has fully backed the “Jan. 6 guys”—and pressure Brazil’s judiciary to grant his father amnesty.
But Trump’s repudiation of the Lula administration that replaced Bolsonaro has sent a message to Brazil that the U.S. is not a reliable partner given that the president who won two of the last three elections will punitively target the country when its citizens do not return an election verdict to his liking.
This could well cause South America’s largest economic and military power to move away from the U.S. and closer to China, already its top trading partner.
Bolsonaro’s Anti-China Posture Depends on Trump
If the U.S. wants to compete with China on trade and investment in Brazil, using tariffs to pressure the country into electing a right-wing government is likely to ricochet. Even if a Bolsonaro-led government were to align more closely with Washington, that alignment would depend heavily on Trump being in the White House. As past experience has shown, such an alliance is fragile and could quickly dissolve if Republicans lose power again. Bolsonaro recently claimed, “I am the person who can stop China, as long as I have a warlike, nuclear nation behind me. Up north.” But his anti-China posture rests entirely on his relationship with Trump, an alliance that is neither guaranteed nor likely to endure.
During his presidency, Bolsonaro was initially hostile toward China, but his stance softened midway through his term, especially after Trump’s 2020 defeat. This shift was largely driven by Brazil’s growing isolation, coupled with intense pressure from its powerful agribusiness lobby, which has a vested interest in maintaining warm ties with Beijing. Brazil depends heavily on trade with China, the buyer of about 30% of its total exports, including most of its soybeans and beef. Hence Bolsonaro eventually deepened Brazil’s economic ties with China. Trade between the two countries rose by 35% from 2019 to 2021, while Chinese investment in Brazil soared to one of its highest levels. Bolsonaro even resisted U.S. demands to exclude Chinese telecom giant Huawei from Brazil’s 5G rollout.
By the end of his first term, Bolsonaro had alienated Brazil’s Western allies to such a degree that his rhetoric and posture became more anti-West than anti-China. The result was a more isolated Brazil, creating space for China to expand its foothold.
Lula went further than Bolsonaro in expanding ties with China. He has signed more than a dozen agreements with President Xi Jinping, many of them focused on infrastructure and development. Since the beginning of Lula’s current term, trade between the two countries has flourished. A report published by the Brazil-China Business Council shows that Chinese investment in Brazil more than doubled in 2024. Brazil was also the top emerging market for Chinese overseas investment worldwide.
For those visiting Brazil, China’s growing role in electric vehicles (EV) is hard to miss. Led by Chinese automaker BYD, Beijing has quickly established itself as a dominant force in Brazil’s EV market. In the first half of 2025, BYD commanded a staggering 76% market share in Brazil, dwarfing its nearest competitor, Volvo, which held just 8.5%.
While the U.S. has banned Chinese EVs and the E.U. has imposed steep tariffs, Brazil, the world’s sixth-largest car market, has become a welcoming destination for China’s booming EV industry. Chinese automakers have not only offered Brazil affordable and reliable vehicles; they have also proven remarkably swift at adapting to Brazil’s unique market conditions. Given Brazil’s vast ethanol production and a national law mandating that all gasoline contain over 25% ethanol, Chinese companies have prioritized plug-in hybrids compatible with ethanol fuel. BYD is also building a megafactory in Bahia that will create over 20,000 new jobs, a move encouraged by new regulations requiring foreign carmakers to manufacture locally.
But Chinese manufacturers are winning in Brazil not only because they are providing better products. They are also winning because Trump’s tariffs are upending U.S.-Brazil trade. Projections show that Brazil may lose up to 146,000 jobs over the next two years and see its agricultural exports to the U.S. cut by half. The tariffs are also expected to drive up prices on certain goods for Americans, with coffee prices in New York hitting an all-time high this week. More fundamentally, the tariffs risk driving a deep wedge between the two countries that may prove difficult to repair.
Trump’s Regime Change Tactics May Backfire
To many Brazilians, Trump’s pressure campaign revives memories of Washington’s Cold War history of interference in South America, a legacy that remains vivid in public memory. His actions quickly triggered a “rally-around-the-flag” effect, boosting Lula’s popularity, uniting his patriotic and progressive base, and possibly strengthening the very leader Trump wants to topple.
Following Trump’s tariffs, Lula held a televised address titled “Sovereign Brazil” in which he condemned Trump’s interference as a direct attack on Brazil’s democracy and a threat to judicial independence. “Brazil is not a colony,” he said. He has since doubled down on his stance, declaring that he would not take orders from Trump.
China is already seizing the moment. In a pointed reference to recent U.S. actions, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi told his Brazilian counterpart Mauro Vieira last month that China is willing to strengthen coordination with Brazil to “resist unilateralism and bullying.”
Among the Brazilian public, the jury is still out on China, but this could easily change in light of Trump’s actions. Brazilian views on China are mixed: a July 2025 Pew poll found that a majority of Brazilians hold favorable opinions on China, while other polling suggests growing concern about China’s expanding influence. If Brazilians tie their economic hardship to U.S. tariffs, and if they come to see the U.S. as punitively rebuking the decision the Brazilian people made at the polls, China may begin to look like the better partner.
Backing Strongmen, Losing Allies
Taken together, these developments suggest a sobering reality: An undemocratic, communistic country is coming to be seen by Brazil as a more trustworthy partner than one founded on liberal democratic principles.
Trump’s hyper-partisan approach to Brazil signals a troubling shift. The U.S. is no longer simply retreating from democratic leadership in Latin America; it is actively undermining it.
The U.S. president’s stance toward Brazil effectively prioritizes his ideological vision above America’s long-term interests. In the process, he risks undoing two centuries of strategic partnership. The more he insists on helping to reinstall Bolsonaro or shoring up Brazil’s populist movement, the more he jeopardizes the U.S.’s interests and standing in the region and pushes Brazil further from its orbit and toward greater dependence on China.
© The UnPopulist, 2025
Follow us on Bluesky, Threads, YouTube, TikTok, Facebook, Instagram, and X.
We welcome your reactions and replies. Please adhere to our comments policy.
 | A guest post by
|
In addition to pushing Brazil toward China, trump and rubio’s arrogant, dangerous petulance gives further weight to the argument that our other allies need to shore up allegiances with each other and cut as many ties as possible with the US to protect themselves.