Russia Resurrected and Exported a Fascist Ideology to the West

That the Trump administration is targeting ‘enemies within’ instead of Putin shows how much America has already succumbed to it

FotoField, Shutterstock, The UnPopulist illustration

Dear Readers:

Our Sunday read for you is a fascinating conversation between Zaza Bibilashvili of Akhali Iveria, a Georgia-based magazine, and Tom G. Palmer, a longtime contributor to The UnPopulist, political theorist, and lifelong activist for liberal principles around the globe. They discuss the real force that is driving the global fascination with fascism and what that portends for the West, if not defused. Tom is not just a preacher of liberty but also a foot soldier. He smuggled forbidden literature and other tools into Communist countries in the 1980s. And then, when Russia attacked Ukraine, he again jumped into action and did regular runs, taking fleeing refugees out of—and vital supplies into—Ukraine. He is affiliated the Fundación para el Avance de la Libertad in Madrid, the Cato Institute, Atlas Network, and IES-Europe.

Berny Belvedere
Senior Editor

The following transcript has been lightly edited for flow and clarity.

Zaza Bibilashvili: Over the last decades we’ve witnessed the rise of authoritarianism and a worldwide crisis of liberal democracy. What caused such developments and what should be done to reverse the trend?

Tom G. Palmer: Most prognoses focus on demographics, technological changes, economic structures, and so on, which gives an air of inevitability to trends. I think that there are such contributing factors, notably the rise of media fragmentation due to the internet and social media, but the rise of authoritarianism was not an inevitable consequence of some autonomous “forces” of technology or demography.

I think that we should pay attention to the deliberate cultivation of a multi-purpose ideology of authoritarianism in Russia. Putin consolidated his authority when he understood that with oil money, he no longer needed anything approaching the rule of law for society to generate surpluses sufficient for him to expropriate. The rise in oil prices at the start of his reign, with the very steep rise from 2004 to 2008, freed him to be the tyrant he wanted to be. He had begun to reestablish state control—that is, his control over oil and gas—rather dramatically with the arrest of Mikhail Khodorkovsky at the end of 2003.

A convenient ideology of power was also on the shelf, so to speak. It’s also worth paying attention to the bizarre neo-Nazi ideologue Alexandr Dugin, who published his book Foundations of Geopolitics in 1997. That book was widely circulated among leading Russian military and political elites around Putin. To be sure, Dugin is an authentic kook, but a smart one, and his books and efforts had a very large impact in Russia. He boldly resurrected fascist ideology and he called for a global jihad against the U.S., as a liberal state, as well as on liberalism generally. In 1997 he had called on the Russian state, “to introduce geopolitical disorder into internal American activity, encouraging all kinds of separatism and ethnic, social, and racial conflicts, actively supporting all dissident movements— extremist, racist, and sectarian groups, thus destabilizing internal political processes in the U.S.” That strategy was later deployed through such entities as the St. Petersburg-based Internet Research Agency (IRA) that was set up by Yevgeny Prigozhin, who founded it for information warfare and the Wagner Group for brutal kinetic warfare against liberal societies and movements.

Dugin and others on both the far right and the far left have been busy resurrecting the ideas of Carl Schmitt and other Nazi and Nazi-facilitating thinkers of what was called the “Conservative Revolution” in Germany from the 1920s to the 1940s. Schmitt’s systemic attacks on liberalism generally, and specifically on deliberative democracy, the market economy, and the rule of law—that is, on law based on rules—have been undergoing a renaissance. His theory of geopolitics, or Großraumordnung, is foundational for Putin’s strategy. It was a core element of Dugin’s book on geopolitics.

“It’s time to institute a presumption of liberty for economic innovation—permissionless innovation, as it’s called. The accretion of cronyism is not only a problem in Russia—it’s very real almost everywhere and it is very much a function of the state privileging those who are already “in” at the expense of those who are ‘out.’ That’s not just about the old stereotypes of cigar-smoking industrialists in black silk top hats; it’s far more systemic and is found wherever state interventionism creates a space for what political economists call ‘Directly Unproductive Rent-Seeking,’ now usually just shortened to ‘rent-seeking,’ that is, securing wealth without actually creating additional value for others.” — Tom G. Palmer

A key moment for the Russian regime was the challenge to its grip on power in 2011 during the Russian opposition’s marches for fair elections. Putin saw liberalism as a challenge to him personally and he eagerly took up the recommendation from Dugin and other extremists to wage war on liberalism globally.

Russia consequently became a major state sponsor of illiberalism and Putin and his cronies, such as Constantin Malofeev and Vladimir Yakunin, poured vast amounts of money and other resources into far-right causes and their global campaigns against liberalism.

I don’t believe that history can be deduced from initial conditions. There is also contingency. As an example, consider the freakish ascendency of Donald Trump, who was one of 17 candidates for the Republican nomination in 2015, when the field included 15 reputable Republican senators, representatives, and governors, a quirky brain surgeon, and one media-savvy reality-TV star with the remarkable ability to capture nearly 100% of the media attention through his provocations, trolling, and deliberate outrageousness. Trump won in 2016—with more than a little Russian help—and he then proceeded, with the help of ideologues such as Steve Bannon—a big fan of Julius Evola, another fascist theoretician—to capture nearly 100% of one of the two major parties. None of that was inevitable, but it was certainly consequential.

Bibilashvili: The Trump administration has announced what amounts to a new national security doctrine. It clearly has a different international agenda, in which democracy, human rights, and supporting European allies are no longer a priority. What are the potential implications for Georgia, Ukraine, and other frontline nations fighting resurgent Russia?

Palmer: The Trump administration seems to have decided that the real threats to the United States, by which they mean Donald Trump’s hold on power, are not the dictatorships of China and Russia, but the democracies of Europe. The U.S. is now removing visa and financial restrictions on Russian criminals and imposing them on European political figures. Increasingly, major elements of the Trump administration are now clearly aligned with Putin’s global crusade against traditional American values and principles. The Russian state spent years cultivating connections in the U.S. and they now have valuable assets, such as Tulsi Gabbard, in the White House.

“Most prognoses focus on demographics, technological changes, economic structures, and so on, which gives an air of inevitability to trends. I think that there are such contributing factors, notably the rise of media fragmentation due to the internet and social media, but the rise of authoritarianism was not an inevitable consequence of some autonomous ‘forces’ of technology or demography. I think that we should pay attention to the deliberate cultivation of a multi-purpose ideology of authoritarianism in Russia.” — Tom G. Palmer

I am rather confident that the other members of the “Five Eyes” intelligence grouping—the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, as well as various friendly democratic countries—are less willing to share methods and findings with the U.S., certainly after Trump himself casually revealed sensitive matters to the Russian ambassador and foreign minister, not to mention other measures that would alarm anyone with sense. The Trumpists have done much to alienate long-time allies. I think it rather clear that information shared with parts of the Trump administration are likely to end up in the Kremlin rather soon, which has resulted in far less sharing of intelligence among democratic countries globally.

Bibilashvili: For nearly four years, Ukraine has been fighting not just for its own independence and sovereignty, but for the entire free world and the rules-based world order. You have personally done a lot to support Ukrainians in that battle. What were your first impressions when you arrived on the ground in the early stages of the war in 2022? What policies and approaches have enabled Ukraine to persevere against a superior enemy?

Palmer: It was a strange time. I spent a lot of time driving supplies to Ukraine and returning to Poland with refugees—moms and kids and cats, but also less mobile elderly people—and aid workers who needed rides back after delivering ambulances and other vehicles. Time moved differently. I spent a number of nights sleeping in the car in freezing cold and some days had to drive for as many as 16 hours in a 24-hour period. I bought vehicles for use by myself and by Ukrainians and volunteers from other countries and loaded them with medical wound-healing devices, tactical backpacks, boots, socks—as soldiers will tell you, clean socks matter when you’re in the trenches, body armor, helmets, and medicines, wound dressings, and a lot more.

One of the things I learned seems, perhaps, a bit banal. But it was a key moment for me. Very early on I was driving with a load of supplies and I passed a car wash, where a man was washing his car. It seemed so strange. Why would you wash your car when your country has been invaded? But I knew the answer: it was because his car was dirty. Even under such awful circumstances, life still goes on. President Zelenskyy reaffirmed that when he urged Ukrainians to go to work, to show up at banks and farm fields and factories and phone stores and restaurants and clothing stores and all the other firms and activities of a normal market economy. The Ukrainians have to live and they have to generate wealth to be able to defend themselves.

As to the elements of the Ukrainian experience that have enabled them to persevere, I would put at the top of the list an active civil society. When Putin’s dictatorship first invaded Ukraine in 2014, there was virtually no military there to defend the country. It had been hollowed out by the man Putin had introduced to lead Ukraine, Viktor Yanukovych, who looted the state and left it virtually defenseless. Most of the tanks in storage lacked key components needed to work, such as batteries and engines, as those had been looted and sold by regime figures. The country was bankrupt and the military had very little equipment and was defended at first by a poorly trained and maintained army. Those who rushed to the defense of their country were volunteers, including not only volunteer fighters, but volunteer supporters, who repaired gear, cooked food for the soldiers, repaired and delivered equipment, raised money, sewed uniforms, and much, much more. They were taxi drivers and engineers and musicians and baristas and teachers and farmers and bus drivers and retirees. As a result, the military of Ukraine is likely the most decentralized and horizontally organized defense force in the world.

We saw that also in 2022 when the citizens of Irpin stopped the Russian advance, blew up the bridge, evacuated the people, and gave time for the regular army to counterattack. I was honored to be able with my friend Maryan Zablotskyy, a member of parliament, to deliver to defenders in Irpin firearms confiscated from criminals and donated by the City of Miami to the brave defenders of Ukraine.

“Designation of ‘The Enemy’ is the key pillar of populism, which differentiates the population into ‘the people’ and ‘the enemies of the people.’ Populist authoritarians such as Ernesto Laclau, the Peronist, Marxist, and later ‘Post-Marxist,’ author of On Populist Reason who has had such an influence on the far-left, as well as his inspiration, Carl Schmitt, make it clear. There are the people and then there are the enemies of the people, who can be anyone. The people is a construct of the populist demagogue, a construct that is arrived at precisely by the designation of the enemy.” — Tom G. Palmer

Today, soldiers on the front lines are not merely issued gear by the top generals; they place orders for what they know that they need, for what they know works where they are, and to a remarkable extent with funds that they raise through donations from supporters. And now, in recognition of the success of this approach, which was developed out of necessity, the Ministry of Defense allocates funds for local units to place orders with manufacturers and suppliers, without having to go through endless mazes of bureaucracy. The involvement of a decentralized, polycentric, and pluralistic civil society in the common defense of the country may be their greatest strength.

Bibilashvili: Truth be told, Ukraine couldn’t defend itself without massive Western financial and military assistance. U.S. support has diminished drastically and once again it seems like the U.S. is pressuring Ukraine into surrender. The question on everyone’s mind is whether Europe can fill the shortage caused by the de facto U.S. withdrawal, and does Europe have enough political will to do so?

Palmer: No doubt, after the Ukrainian state gave up its missiles—both nuclear and non-nuclear—under the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, completing disarmament by 1996, in exchange for what were discovered to be worthless assurances of security and nonaggression, the availability of weapons from other countries was extremely important to their defense.

The U.S. support was certainly important, but it is often overstated, for several reasons. First, the accounting in dollar terms often used replacement costs, which grossly overstated by billions of dollars the totals. Many items were quite old and had net book values of zero, or were even scheduled for imminent decommissioning, which itself costs money. Second, the restrictions placed on them, out of fear of Russian saber rattling, limited their effectiveness. The U.S. was far too timid, in my opinion. None of that is to scorn the U.S. contribution, but it was grossly overstated in government statements.

The U.S. government now provides virtually nothing. European support has grown and we have seen a number of European countries make very consequential commitments. Europe is stepping up, but Europe must step up even more and—what is vitally important—they must do so in tandem with Ukraine, not only for Ukraine, but for their own survival. The future of defense is not more gold-plated battleships or extremely pricey high-performance weapons that take years to develop and manufacture, but rapid innovation and rapid production of much cheaper reasonably-smart weapons. The Ukrainians are pioneers in that field. The Europeans need to listen closely to the Ukrainians and to learn from them by working with them. Ukrainian engineered and tested defensive systems can and should be produced in other European countries. Perhaps a part of the licensing agreement would be to deliver a portion of the output to Ukraine. Drones are the most well-known example of tech where the Ukrainians are the most advanced, but they are not the only example.

“The Trump administration seems to have decided that the real threats to the United States, by which they mean Donald Trump’s hold on power, are not the dictatorships of China and Russia, but the democracies of Europe. The U.S. is now removing visa and financial restrictions on Russian criminals and imposing them on European political figures. Increasingly, major elements of the Trump administration are now clearly aligned with Putin’s global crusade against traditional American values and principles. The Russian state spent years cultivating connections in the U.S. and they now have valuable assets, such as Tulsi Gabbard, in the White House.” — Tom G. Palmer

If the Europeans don’t step up soon and coordinate with and support Ukraine, they will someday soon—possibly before 2030—find themselves overwhelmed with massive swarms of fairly cheap drones that will take out key infrastructure, disable military capabilities, attack media and political leadership, and wreak havoc on the population, after, of course, cyber warfare has disabled the electrical grids, dams, telecommunications, hospital management systems, and the like. I hope that the defense of Europe, which can only happen in coordination with the defense of Ukraine, will be in time.

The will to defend themselves—and to do so the most effective way, which is to help Ukraine—is growing. Of course, the Russian propaganda apparatus is busy deploying the usual disinformation and claiming that moves to defend oneself are “war mongering,” and they have their pet politicians, often paid, sometimes blackmailed, frequently aligned with anti-democratic dictatorial ideologies, but without doubt valued assets of an aggressive foreign state that seeks to subdue the free countries of Europe. Hybrid warfare involves subversion of normal political processes, hosing down societies with what the RAND Corporation called “the firehose of falsehoods,” and suborning members of parliaments, all in a combined strategy that includes cutting undersea cables, deploying mapping drones over seaports and airports, blowing up trains and warehouses, and more, to be completed with kinetic attacks of the sort we normally associate with warfare.

Bibilashvili: What will be the future of liberal democracy and rules-based international order if Russia wins in Ukraine?

Palmer: Such an outcome would be a catastrophe for the world, not only for the Ukrainians, who would initially suffer the most terrible consequences of filtration camps, systematic torture, rape, executions, and kidnapping of their children, followed by conscription into a far larger army that would be sent in meat waves against Europe, with punishment brigades executing those who do not surge forward to their deaths. They would suffer unspeakably. It would be like the previous Nazi occupation of Poland and Ukraine. It would be a horror.

For the rest of the world, it would mean the shattering of the various forms of cooperation among democratic and free countries, which would then be picked off one by one. If the Trumpists manage to completely take over the U.S. and create the dictatorship the hard-core among them seek, the world would be divided up, as Trump envisions, between his region of power and those of Xi and Putin. Europe would be subject to constant hybrid warfare and degradation of their defensive capabilities, as well as deliberate efforts to substitute dictatorships for liberal democratic systems. Parts of Europe would be militarily occupied, especially those that have Russian-speaking populations—to “rescue” them—or that were part of the Soviet or Russian empires. Africans would be at the mercy of a brutal new colonialism led by Russia and China, with perhaps Trumpistan taking a slice. Xi would likely assert—more cautiously than the less risk-averse Putin—much greater hegemonic power over East Asia, likely including a full-scale attack on Taiwan and possibly attacks on Japan and even Korea.

“The U.S. government now provides virtually nothing. European support has grown and we have seen a number of European countries make very consequential commitments. Europe is stepping up, but Europe must step up even more and—what is vitally important—they must do so in tandem with Ukraine, not only for Ukraine, but for their own survival. The future of defense is not more gold-plated battleships or extremely pricey high-performance weapons that take years to develop and manufacture, but rapid innovation and rapid production of much cheaper reasonably-smart weapons. The Ukrainians are pioneers in that field. The Europeans need to listen closely to the Ukrainians and to learn from them by working with them.” — Tom G. Palmer

I believe that the fight for liberal democracy takes place along many axes—intellectual, political, moral, legal, and so on, but the military fight through Ukraine is likely the most important at present. The courage of the Ukrainians, of the Georgians, and of the Moldovans in standing up to the Fourth Reich is an inspiration to everyone who wants to live freely and without fear. They not only need our support; they deserve it.

Bibilashvili: Mainstream liberal ideology, manifested in traditional center-left and center-right parties, faces many challenges in the Western world. We have seen a sharp rise of far-right or far-left populism across the European continent. Many citizens feel that the system and their political establishment have failed them. What reforms should be undertaken to overcome this fundamental challenge?

Palmer: We need to meet the ideological challenge of populism head on, and specifically in the form it takes of designating our fellow citizens, with whom we may disagree and from whom we may be differentiated by religion, interests, and much more, as “Enemies.” Designation of “The Enemy” is the key pillar of populism, which differentiates the population into “the people” and “the enemies of the people.” Populist authoritarians such as Ernesto Laclau, the Peronist, Marxist, and later “Post-Marxist,” author of On Populist Reason who has had such an influence on the far-left, as well as his inspiration, Carl Schmitt, make it clear. There are the people and then there are the enemies of the people, who can be anyone. The people is a construct of the populist demagogue, a construct that is arrived at precisely by the designation of the enemy. The insightful liberal pluralist Isaiah Berlin noted in 1967 of populism that, “Whether falsely or truly, it stands for the majority of men, the majority of men who have somehow been damaged. By whom have they been damaged? They have been damaged by an elite, either economic, political or racial, some kind of secret or open enemy—capitalism, Jews and the rest of it. Whoever the enemy is, foreign or native, ethnic or social, does not much matter.”

So all kinds of illiberal movements that superficially may seem very different share the same commitment, that the people are being victimized by “The Enemy”—for the Trumpists, it’s the “M&M”s, Media, Mexicans, and Muslims; for others it’s the Jews, or their proxies, the “1%,” the “financial elites.” Immigrants at present are easily designated hostile enemies. It matters a lot that the designated enemies are rarely the people you actually know. That’s a common pattern.

We need to work to overcome the demonization of others, whether ethnic groups or political “enemies”—liberals, conservatives, lefties, righties, moderates, whatever. You can be opponents without being enemies.

“I believe that the fight for liberal democracy takes place along many axes—intellectual, political, moral, legal, and so on, but the military fight through Ukraine is likely the most important at present. The courage of the Ukrainians, of the Georgians, and of the Moldovans in standing up to the Fourth Reich is an inspiration to everyone who wants to live freely and without fear. They not only need our support; they deserve it.” — Tom G. Palmer

Then, as to policy issues, I think it’s urgent to create more opportunity for economic growth and that means freeing economies from regulatory systems that are sclerotic, smothering, and often pointless, and that impose huge compliance costs that are often in excess of any ostensible public benefits. I believe it’s time to institute a presumption of liberty for economic innovation—permissionless innovation, as it’s called. The accretion of cronyism is not only a problem in Russia—it’s very real almost everywhere and it is very much a function of the state privileging those who are already “in” at the expense of those who are “out.” That’s not just about the old stereotypes of cigar-smoking industrialists in black silk top hats; it’s far more systemic and is found wherever state interventionism creates a space for what political economists call “Directly Unproductive Rent-Seeking,” now usually just shortened to “rent-seeking,” that is, securing wealth without actually creating additional value for others.

On the educational level, I think it’s time for a return to civics education, which many countries used to have, but which were abandoned as the educational systems in democratic countries have wallowed in an oily bath of cynicism, relativism, and postmodern irony. Education could help a citizen of a free country to better understand that she or he is a free person and that free people do not sit still as rights are stripped away, as laws are broken by those trusted to keep them, and as diktat replaces democratic deliberation. A citizen of a free country knows and cherishes the freedom to worship as he or she wishes, to express what he or she believes, to live as she or he prefers, without harming the equal freedom of others. That was a major part of the messages that young people used to get in Europe and in North America and other free and democratic societies, but those messages were dissolved in a lukewarm sludge of relativism, whataboutism, and indifference to the value of liberty for self and for others.

Bibilashvili: Our last question is about Georgia. Many experts argue that GD [Georgian Dream] has already become an authoritarian regime and is quickly moving towards totalitarianism. We have more than 150 political prisoners, most opposition leaders are in jail or in exile, independent media is on its last breath, NGOs and civil society have effectively been stifled through repressive laws. What would be your message/advice to Georgian citizens, activists and people who continue to fight an uphill battle against Ivanishvili’s Russian-backed GD regime?

Palmer: You are not alone. You have friends. Your cause is noble; the forces arrayed against you are powerful; and you are our heroes. It is partly about persevering. I think that if the Russian state stumbles, their puppets in other countries will quickly fall—in Belarus, in Georgia, and elsewhere. This is not a sprint, but a marathon. That means putting ourselves into it, but pacing ourselves, as well; not burning ourselves out because we do not win this week, this month, this year, for we will be in the race against tyranny for years to come.

All that said, we should also recognize that the tyrants are fighting for the sake of power, for power for its own sake, but also for the sake of the dirty money it brings to them, taken from honest and productive people. And when their money is threatened, the tyrants and their cronies and paid enforcers can be truly vicious. They love their dirty money and they will fight to keep the power that gives them access to streams of it. Do not underestimate how crude, cruel, or violent they may become. But know, at the end of the day, that they have the morality of rats fighting over a sandwich they have stolen from a plate. You are better than they are. And they know it.

An earlier version of this article first appeared in Akhali Iveria.

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