Thank you for this illuminating article. For those of us who have only a "headline understanding" of events in South Korea it has been very helpful in grasping what is happening on the ground there and not just from 30,000 feet above.
Americans tend to focus so intensely on China, and occasionally on Japan, we tend to ignore the rest of Asia.
I’m sort of confused by this account of polarization in Korea.
Rightists are accused of being pro-Japan, leftists are accused of being pro-North Korea.
Ok, but it doesn’t seem like that has much to do with how South Korea should be governed? Obviously relations with North Korea are important, but why is stuff like comfort women the center of politics?
What are the actual policy stakes? The two sides don’t seem that divided over economics or culture other than how to talk about the past. I noticed that Yoon justified the coup attempt by saying the left party didn’t spend as much money as he wanted. This is bizarre to an American.
Thank you for engaging with our article and raising these thoughtful questions, Richard!
Historically, political orientation in South Korea has been less defined by issues like economic distribution or traditional cultural divides, which are prominent in Western democracies, and more by attitudes toward neighboring countries—Japan and North Korea (and China, for that matter). For decades, right-leaning groups have been associated with pro-Japan or anti-North Korea stances, while left-leaning groups have often been accused of being pro-North Korea or emphasizing anti-Japan narratives. These attitudes stem from historical and geopolitical tensions that have profoundly shaped South Korea’s national identity and remain key markers of political affiliation.
This dynamic creates a landscape where “how to talk about the past” becomes a central political cleavage, as narratives surrounding issues like the ‘comfort women’ and North Korea’s threats are not just symbolic but are woven into the fabric of South Korea’s political legitimacy and identity. These narratives, shaped heavily by government and party discourse, influence policy priorities, such as how to approach inter-Korean relations, defense spending, or reparations with Japan.
However, I recognize your point that this framework might seem disconnected from practical governance or policy stakes—especially in areas like economic strategy or cultural policy. Here, I’d like to highlight an emerging trend: a shift among younger generations toward issues that resonate more with the postmaterial values seen in Europe, such as economic justice, environmental sustainability, and LGBTQ+ rights. These shifts signal a potential movement away from the traditional cleavage lines defined by history and geopolitics.
This evolution poses an intriguing question about South Korea’s future polarization: Will the old framework dissolve entirely, and if so, what will replace it? While it’s too early to predict definitively, I suspect we might see a growing emphasis on economic and cultural polarization, reflecting broader global trends. However, the deeply ingrained historical narratives tied to South Korea’s unique geopolitical situation won’t disappear overnight—they will likely remain influential, albeit in transformed ways.
Dear Richard: Thanks for your insightful comment and question. I will reply here and in personal email.
1) The dominant divide/debate in Korean politics is analogous to the US ‘faculty lounge’ divide b/t academic elites who argue that America’s founding is fundamentally unjust (racist), i.e., 1619 project, and those who argue for its fundamental justness.
Korea’s progressive Democratic Party elites (e.g., former President Moon) view South Korea’s founding-era Presidents (Rhee Syngman, Park Chung-hee) (1948-1979) as pro-Japan colonial collaborators or sympathizers, and thus fundamentally illegitimate. They reject the founding era in favor of pre-1945 anti-colonial activists or a future, progressive, reunified Korea cleansed of the past, pro-Japan sins. They also reject as illegitimate key institutions and treaties from that era, including the 1965 Normalization Treaty that supposedly settled all claims with Japan; DP-appointed or influenced judges allow former victims to sue Japanese companies or government.
Conversely, conservative party elites see Korea’s founding as legitimate, and feel aggrieved from a cultural mainstream that illegitimates the founding era, much as the 1619 project does in US.
2) Per Lee Wondong’s comments. Old and new issue arenas/cleavages overlap and conflict in interesting ways.
Following intersectionality, most feminists in Korea, US, and Europe join the anti-colonial, Japanese military comfort women movement to criticize an unrepentant Japan. But a minority of feminists also wish to highlight CW for US military, who actually outnumbered the earlier CW for Japanese military. This is something that anti-Japan activists ignore. I recommend Sarah Soh’s award-winning book Comfort Women. My colleagues and I also write about this – publications lists: https://docs.google.com/document/d/10U2y-XINpY-ixleiU2Oz2-7HPVEcq1X42_NuP3YwJIw
I'm left puzzled after reading this article. First, how is free speech considered a procedural right? It's inherently a substantive right. Second, institutionally, the National Assembly has the power to impeach officials. If institutionalists were really "procedural liberals," then they wouldn't scream bloody murder when the DPK procedurally put the impeachment motions on the floor and voted to impeach Yoon and prime minister Han, as the constitution allows. Sure, it may be bare-knuckled tactics, but it's still a procedurally legitimate exercise of power.
It seems to me that polarization is not unique to Korea. What makes South Korea more vulnerable to this kind of shitshow are the inherently illiberal provisions in the South Korean constitution. US presidents don't have martial law powers, constitutionally—they only have emergency powers, granted by Congress. South Korea also has many laws (e.g., criminal defamation, party ban) that are abused to suppress dissent. In the US, it's common sense that the remedy to speech is counterspeech, which is established through legal precedents as well as the First Amendment.
Even more alarming in my view is the South Korean military's enduring appetite for power grabs. No coup can succeed without the military's backing. Ultimately, Yoon's martial law failed because the military didn't fully support it. I'm not even sure we can chalk the botched martial law up to the erosion of democratic norms because the illiberal behaviors that are par for the course in Korean society are not a recent phenomenon. Procedurally, those illiberal behaviors are allowed by law. Therefore, I would argue it's a matter of substance. South Korea should amend the constitution and get rid of Article 37 Clause 2 as well as Article 76 that grants the president martial law powers.
1) Free speech is both a procedural and substantive right, but it is esp. important for fair process in a liberal society.
2) Institutional conservatives such as Han Dong-hoon did support the impeachment motion, and were later marginalized by ore radicalized conservatives.
3) I agree with legal reforms to the executive, but also the legislature: https://www.koreaherald.com/article/10384404 We need to return to basic democratic norms and consider limits on both executive and legislative power, such as requiring formal Cabinet approval for a martial law declaration and a two-thirds majority for any impeachment motion.
If you live in Seoul/Korea (or California), you are welcome to contact me directly: joyichicago@yahoo.com
The part that resonates most with me is where you coined the term "militant democracy radicals". Militant democracy, which originated in the post-Nazi German context, has always felt illiberal to me. Given that democracy alone is not enough to guarantee the "right" outcome and that's the responsibility of liberalism, militant democracy is like throwing out the baby with the bathwater. Yet its tenets have gained wide acceptance around the world, especially in illiberal countries (e.g., Israel). Yoon's botched martial law lays bare the risks of tolerating illiberalism in service of democracy. James Madison's wisdom in Federalist No. 10 seems more relevant than ever: "But it could not be a less folly to abolish liberty, which is essential to political life, because it nourishes faction, than it would be to wish the annihilation of air, which is essential to animal life, because it imparts to fire its destructive agency."
Good man Yoon is braver than Biden and Harris; defending democracy against kimjongputin’s hybrid biochemical warfare:
“President Klaus Iohannis declassified intelligence documents from the supreme council for national defence suggesting that almost 800 Tiktok accounts created by a "foreign state" in 2016 were suddenly activated last month to full capacity, backing Georgescu.
Another 25,000 TikTok accounts had become active only two weeks before the first round.
Romanian foreign intelligence said Russia was the "enemy state" involved and had engaged in hybrid attacks including tens of thousands of cyber attacks and other sabotage.
Domestic intelligence put Georgescu's sudden surge in popularity down to a "highly organised" and "guerilla" social media campaign" that involved identical messaging and social media influencers.
TikToks promoting him were not marked as election content, violating Romania's laws, it said, while one account paid out $381,000 (£300,000) in the space of a month to users who pushed Georgescu's candidacy, while he said he had not paid anything for his campaign.
That decision to declassify intelligence documents changed everything.”
“TikTok, along with 58 other Chinese-created apps,[23] was banned completely in India by the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology on 29 June 2020, with a statement saying they were "prejudicial to the sovereignty and integrity of India, defence of India, security of state, and public order"”
“Under Proclamation No. 1 (martial law decree) effective as of 11:00 p.m. (KST), the following measures have been implemented:”
“..Any act that denies or attempts to subvert the democratic system is prohibited, including fake news, manipulation of public opinion, and false incitement…”
“..Except for antistate forces and those attempting to subvert the system, innocent citizens will be provided with measures to minimize disruptions to their daily lives…”
“Q2: Is this declaration of emergency martial law unprecedented?
A2: No, there have been 16 martial law declarations since the country was founded in 1948. Under Article 77 of the South Korean Constitution, a president may declare martial law in response to war, incidents, or other national emergencies.
There are two types of martial law: emergency and security.”
“President Yoon Suk Yeol declared emergency martial law Tuesday, accusing the nation's opposition of paralyzing the government with "anti-state activities plotting rebellion."
"The martial law is aimed at eradicating pro-North Korean forces and to protect the constitutional order of freedom," Yoon said in the televised address.”
“Yoon said the decision to declare martial law was aimed at "rebuilding and safeguarding" the nation, which he described as facing significant challenges. While the declaration might cause "some inconvenience" to citizens, Yoon vowed to "normalize" the country swiftly, saying
the government remains committed to its foreign policy of fulfilling its responsibilities within the international community.”
“Denouncing Lee as an international embarrassment, Yoon said he would make an apology to Ukraine on behalf of South Korea, citing posts critical of Lee's remarks that have been uploaded on Reddit, a popular American online community.
"President Zelenskyy has been staying in Kyiv and leading his country's fight against Russia rather than fleeing, but Lee's remarks were an act of mocking 72 percent of the Ukrainian people who are supporting him," Yoon wrote on Facebook, adding that Lee's accusation of Zelenskyy was the outcome of ignorance.
Liberal political commentator Chin Jung-kwon also took a shot at Lee, saying on Facebook, "While the international community is watching the tragedy taking place in Ukraine,
Thank you for this illuminating article. For those of us who have only a "headline understanding" of events in South Korea it has been very helpful in grasping what is happening on the ground there and not just from 30,000 feet above.
Americans tend to focus so intensely on China, and occasionally on Japan, we tend to ignore the rest of Asia.
Thanks for your kind words, Harley!
Thanks for your kind comments, Harley! Joseph
I’m sort of confused by this account of polarization in Korea.
Rightists are accused of being pro-Japan, leftists are accused of being pro-North Korea.
Ok, but it doesn’t seem like that has much to do with how South Korea should be governed? Obviously relations with North Korea are important, but why is stuff like comfort women the center of politics?
What are the actual policy stakes? The two sides don’t seem that divided over economics or culture other than how to talk about the past. I noticed that Yoon justified the coup attempt by saying the left party didn’t spend as much money as he wanted. This is bizarre to an American.
Can you help us understand?
Thank you for engaging with our article and raising these thoughtful questions, Richard!
Historically, political orientation in South Korea has been less defined by issues like economic distribution or traditional cultural divides, which are prominent in Western democracies, and more by attitudes toward neighboring countries—Japan and North Korea (and China, for that matter). For decades, right-leaning groups have been associated with pro-Japan or anti-North Korea stances, while left-leaning groups have often been accused of being pro-North Korea or emphasizing anti-Japan narratives. These attitudes stem from historical and geopolitical tensions that have profoundly shaped South Korea’s national identity and remain key markers of political affiliation.
This dynamic creates a landscape where “how to talk about the past” becomes a central political cleavage, as narratives surrounding issues like the ‘comfort women’ and North Korea’s threats are not just symbolic but are woven into the fabric of South Korea’s political legitimacy and identity. These narratives, shaped heavily by government and party discourse, influence policy priorities, such as how to approach inter-Korean relations, defense spending, or reparations with Japan.
However, I recognize your point that this framework might seem disconnected from practical governance or policy stakes—especially in areas like economic strategy or cultural policy. Here, I’d like to highlight an emerging trend: a shift among younger generations toward issues that resonate more with the postmaterial values seen in Europe, such as economic justice, environmental sustainability, and LGBTQ+ rights. These shifts signal a potential movement away from the traditional cleavage lines defined by history and geopolitics.
This evolution poses an intriguing question about South Korea’s future polarization: Will the old framework dissolve entirely, and if so, what will replace it? While it’s too early to predict definitively, I suspect we might see a growing emphasis on economic and cultural polarization, reflecting broader global trends. However, the deeply ingrained historical narratives tied to South Korea’s unique geopolitical situation won’t disappear overnight—they will likely remain influential, albeit in transformed ways.
Thank you. That was very interesting. We hear quite a bit about feminism and anti-feminism in Korea, and so maybe this is the beginning of that trend.
Dear Richard: Thanks for your insightful comment and question. I will reply here and in personal email.
1) The dominant divide/debate in Korean politics is analogous to the US ‘faculty lounge’ divide b/t academic elites who argue that America’s founding is fundamentally unjust (racist), i.e., 1619 project, and those who argue for its fundamental justness.
Korea’s progressive Democratic Party elites (e.g., former President Moon) view South Korea’s founding-era Presidents (Rhee Syngman, Park Chung-hee) (1948-1979) as pro-Japan colonial collaborators or sympathizers, and thus fundamentally illegitimate. They reject the founding era in favor of pre-1945 anti-colonial activists or a future, progressive, reunified Korea cleansed of the past, pro-Japan sins. They also reject as illegitimate key institutions and treaties from that era, including the 1965 Normalization Treaty that supposedly settled all claims with Japan; DP-appointed or influenced judges allow former victims to sue Japanese companies or government.
Conversely, conservative party elites see Korea’s founding as legitimate, and feel aggrieved from a cultural mainstream that illegitimates the founding era, much as the 1619 project does in US.
2) Per Lee Wondong’s comments. Old and new issue arenas/cleavages overlap and conflict in interesting ways.
Following intersectionality, most feminists in Korea, US, and Europe join the anti-colonial, Japanese military comfort women movement to criticize an unrepentant Japan. But a minority of feminists also wish to highlight CW for US military, who actually outnumbered the earlier CW for Japanese military. This is something that anti-Japan activists ignore. I recommend Sarah Soh’s award-winning book Comfort Women. My colleagues and I also write about this – publications lists: https://docs.google.com/document/d/10U2y-XINpY-ixleiU2Oz2-7HPVEcq1X42_NuP3YwJIw
Also: What is your email? I can send more info and references, and keep in touch.
Mine: joyichicago@yahoo.com
I'm left puzzled after reading this article. First, how is free speech considered a procedural right? It's inherently a substantive right. Second, institutionally, the National Assembly has the power to impeach officials. If institutionalists were really "procedural liberals," then they wouldn't scream bloody murder when the DPK procedurally put the impeachment motions on the floor and voted to impeach Yoon and prime minister Han, as the constitution allows. Sure, it may be bare-knuckled tactics, but it's still a procedurally legitimate exercise of power.
It seems to me that polarization is not unique to Korea. What makes South Korea more vulnerable to this kind of shitshow are the inherently illiberal provisions in the South Korean constitution. US presidents don't have martial law powers, constitutionally—they only have emergency powers, granted by Congress. South Korea also has many laws (e.g., criminal defamation, party ban) that are abused to suppress dissent. In the US, it's common sense that the remedy to speech is counterspeech, which is established through legal precedents as well as the First Amendment.
Even more alarming in my view is the South Korean military's enduring appetite for power grabs. No coup can succeed without the military's backing. Ultimately, Yoon's martial law failed because the military didn't fully support it. I'm not even sure we can chalk the botched martial law up to the erosion of democratic norms because the illiberal behaviors that are par for the course in Korean society are not a recent phenomenon. Procedurally, those illiberal behaviors are allowed by law. Therefore, I would argue it's a matter of substance. South Korea should amend the constitution and get rid of Article 37 Clause 2 as well as Article 76 that grants the president martial law powers.
Thanks for your detailed comment.
1) Free speech is both a procedural and substantive right, but it is esp. important for fair process in a liberal society.
2) Institutional conservatives such as Han Dong-hoon did support the impeachment motion, and were later marginalized by ore radicalized conservatives.
3) I agree with legal reforms to the executive, but also the legislature: https://www.koreaherald.com/article/10384404 We need to return to basic democratic norms and consider limits on both executive and legislative power, such as requiring formal Cabinet approval for a martial law declaration and a two-thirds majority for any impeachment motion.
If you live in Seoul/Korea (or California), you are welcome to contact me directly: joyichicago@yahoo.com
The part that resonates most with me is where you coined the term "militant democracy radicals". Militant democracy, which originated in the post-Nazi German context, has always felt illiberal to me. Given that democracy alone is not enough to guarantee the "right" outcome and that's the responsibility of liberalism, militant democracy is like throwing out the baby with the bathwater. Yet its tenets have gained wide acceptance around the world, especially in illiberal countries (e.g., Israel). Yoon's botched martial law lays bare the risks of tolerating illiberalism in service of democracy. James Madison's wisdom in Federalist No. 10 seems more relevant than ever: "But it could not be a less folly to abolish liberty, which is essential to political life, because it nourishes faction, than it would be to wish the annihilation of air, which is essential to animal life, because it imparts to fire its destructive agency."
I agree ~ keep in touch! joyichicago@yahoo.com
Good man Yoon is braver than Biden and Harris; defending democracy against kimjongputin’s hybrid biochemical warfare:
“President Klaus Iohannis declassified intelligence documents from the supreme council for national defence suggesting that almost 800 Tiktok accounts created by a "foreign state" in 2016 were suddenly activated last month to full capacity, backing Georgescu.
Another 25,000 TikTok accounts had become active only two weeks before the first round.
Romanian foreign intelligence said Russia was the "enemy state" involved and had engaged in hybrid attacks including tens of thousands of cyber attacks and other sabotage.
Domestic intelligence put Georgescu's sudden surge in popularity down to a "highly organised" and "guerilla" social media campaign" that involved identical messaging and social media influencers.
TikToks promoting him were not marked as election content, violating Romania's laws, it said, while one account paid out $381,000 (£300,000) in the space of a month to users who pushed Georgescu's candidacy, while he said he had not paid anything for his campaign.
That decision to declassify intelligence documents changed everything.”
“TikTok, along with 58 other Chinese-created apps,[23] was banned completely in India by the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology on 29 June 2020, with a statement saying they were "prejudicial to the sovereignty and integrity of India, defence of India, security of state, and public order"”
“Under Proclamation No. 1 (martial law decree) effective as of 11:00 p.m. (KST), the following measures have been implemented:”
“..Any act that denies or attempts to subvert the democratic system is prohibited, including fake news, manipulation of public opinion, and false incitement…”
“..Except for antistate forces and those attempting to subvert the system, innocent citizens will be provided with measures to minimize disruptions to their daily lives…”
https://www.csis.org/analysis/yoon-declares-martial-law-south-korea
“Q2: Is this declaration of emergency martial law unprecedented?
A2: No, there have been 16 martial law declarations since the country was founded in 1948. Under Article 77 of the South Korean Constitution, a president may declare martial law in response to war, incidents, or other national emergencies.
There are two types of martial law: emergency and security.”
https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2024/12/113_324616.html
https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2024/12/356_387615.html
https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/2024-12-03/national/politics/Korea-under-emergency-martial-law--What-does-it-mean/2191877
“President Yoon Suk Yeol declared emergency martial law Tuesday, accusing the nation's opposition of paralyzing the government with "anti-state activities plotting rebellion."
"The martial law is aimed at eradicating pro-North Korean forces and to protect the constitutional order of freedom," Yoon said in the televised address.”
“Yoon said the decision to declare martial law was aimed at "rebuilding and safeguarding" the nation, which he described as facing significant challenges. While the declaration might cause "some inconvenience" to citizens, Yoon vowed to "normalize" the country swiftly, saying
the government remains committed to its foreign policy of fulfilling its responsibilities within the international community.”
“Denouncing Lee as an international embarrassment, Yoon said he would make an apology to Ukraine on behalf of South Korea, citing posts critical of Lee's remarks that have been uploaded on Reddit, a popular American online community.
"President Zelenskyy has been staying in Kyiv and leading his country's fight against Russia rather than fleeing, but Lee's remarks were an act of mocking 72 percent of the Ukrainian people who are supporting him," Yoon wrote on Facebook, adding that Lee's accusation of Zelenskyy was the outcome of ignorance.
Liberal political commentator Chin Jung-kwon also took a shot at Lee, saying on Facebook, "While the international community is watching the tragedy taking place in Ukraine,
you,
desperate to get votes,
are only blind to it.
Are you a human being?"
https://pastebin.com/KP4nmD5Y
Thanks for the comment and detailed info; welcome to the debate!