Addressing Cultural Fears Could Renew Public Support for Immigration

A multi-national survey found that requiring immigrants to integrate overcomes much of the opposition to opening the door to them

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Western democracies are facing intensified global economic competition, even as their populations are aging into retirement. Both dynamics are relentless. To supply labor, spur innovation, and shore up social safety nets, Western societies need immigration now more than ever.

Yet in this moment of need, politics is trumping policy. Mainstream leaders who once supported immigration as a boon to their nations’ economic and cultural life are in full-scale retreat. Across Europe, centrist parties have co-opted the restrictive rhetoric and platforms of a resurgent far right. During the U.S. presidential campaign, Democrats pivoted to tougher talk on border enforcement and asylum policy in a gambit to neutralize Donald Trump’s attacks. Seeing the writing on the wall, Justin Trudeau conceded shortly after Trump’s victory that Canada had “made some mistakes” on immigration and would cut admissions.

The political challenges are real, and the public is wary. Indeed, anti-immigration attitudes widely draw on deep-seated cultural fears. Survey research shows that attempts to correct misperceptions about immigrants, to highlight economic benefits, or to tug at people’s heartstrings often fall flat or yield small, fragile, or ephemeral effects.

But our own surveys of attitudes toward immigration in North America and Europe show that there is a more effective way to promote support for increasing immigration than seeking to improve how people feel and think about immigration in the abstract. Rather, we find that the public will favor proposals to increase legal immigration if the proposals require new immigrants to meet basic “integration” requirements, such as obtaining jobs or learning the national language—objectives most immigrants already achieve. While no policy structure or rhetorical approach guarantees political success, requiring a degree of social integration—and ensuring the public is aware of the requirement—provides a promising path back to more open immigration policies in Western countries, and to an American approach more consistent with our country’s interests and values.

Our Recent Survey Findings: Accepting Immigrants in a Nationalist Era

We fielded our surveys in multiple Western nations in December 2024 and again in January 2025, at the height of anti-immigration movements’ recent political success. These surveys built upon what we felt were important findings from our 2020 survey work on Americans’ attitudes toward increasing immigration from Mexico. The surveys also incorporated insights from research we discussed in our 2020 book Immigration and the American Ethos.

Our December round of surveys involved 2,000 or more adults in each of nine countries: the U.S., Canada, U.K., France, Germany, Netherlands, Sweden, Spain, and Italy. Respondents were asked whether they would support or oppose a hypothetical increase of 50,000 immigrants to their country annually. Half of those who were asked this question were told that the immigrants would come from countries in Europe, while the other half were told that the immigrants would come from countries in the Middle East, a region whose emigrants have historically been subject to acute prejudice. We also randomly varied how much additional information people received. A third of respondents read nothing further about the proposed immigration. The remaining two-thirds were informed that, under the policy, immigrants would be required to do four things: secure employment, pay taxes, pass a security background check, and learn the host country’s dominant language.

As expected, the proposal to increase immigration fared poorly among the one-third who heard nothing about the various job and other requirements. Indeed, among these respondents across the nine countries, a mere 19% of those queried backed the proposal involving Middle Eastern immigrants, with 52% opposed and the remainder neutral or undecided. The proposal for European immigrants polled only slightly better, losing 23% to 48%. These results didn’t vary much from country to country. Among those who weren’t told of the integration requirements in the United States, the proposed increase in immigration from the Middle East was rejected 19% to 50%, while the proposed increase in immigration from Europe was rejected 27% to 49%.

But information about the proposal’s four integration requirements completely changed people’s reactions. Among those across all nine Western countries who were told of the requirements to be placed on the immigrants, the Middle East proposal was supported 47% to 26%, and the Europe proposal was favored 52% to 21%. Among those in the United States who were told of the requirements, the proposed immigration from the Middle East was favored 48% to 26%, and the proposed immigration from Europe was favored 56% to 20%.

Thus, while origin-based discrimination persisted, the overriding determinant of support was that the immigrants show they were law-abiding and able to get jobs, pay taxes, and speak the language. These stipulations strongly increased people’s acceptance of increased immigration from both Europe and the Middle East. Equally encouraging, the effects of these requirements on public opinion were similar and large in all nine countries.

How Much ‘Integration’ Is Necessary?

These results raise an interesting question: How many integration requirements are needed to generate support for more immigration? We explored this issue in our second round of surveys, which were administered in January to 1,000 adults in each of five countries: the U.S., Canada, U.K., France, and Germany.

This time, we made support for immigration less likely in several ways. First, we asked people only whether they would approve a policy to admit an additional 50,000 immigrants annually from the Middle East. None of the respondents was asked about immigrants from Europe. Second, while we again gave some respondents additional information about the proposal, we eliminated the language, tax, and security-check requirements on the immigrants; the sole stipulations these respondents heard were that the immigrants were required to hold steady jobs and support themselves without government assistance. Third, we gave these same respondents grounds to reject the proposal, telling them that “experts” doubted the immigrants admitted by this policy would assimilate culturally, linguistically, and socially into the host country.

In part, the result was nearly identical to the first round of surveys: Among those across the five countries who heard only the immigration proposal and not the requirements on immigrants, the proposal was supported by just 19% and opposed by 51%. Among those in the United States who weren’t told of the integration requirements, the proposal was rejected by a modestly smaller margin, 27% to 43%.

Surprisingly, however, despite the reduced requirements placed on the immigrants and the inclusion of “expert” opinion that the Middle Easterners would fail to fully integrate, the proposal still garnered more support than opposition, 37% to 30%, among those in the five countries who heard the proposal’s requirements that immigrants obtain work and stay off welfare.

Further, these large effects were substantially the same in all countries—except in the U.S., where support for the policy vaulted to 47%, with only 16% opposed. This greater American receptivity was likely a reflection of Americans’ tolerance for cultural diversity and of the distinctive priority they place on self-sufficiency, but regardless, people everywhere became much more open to increasing immigration once they learned that it was conditioned on the immigrants’ being employed and independent of government assistance.

Bringing Conservatives on Board

There was another encouraging finding: In both rounds of surveys, the positive effects of learning about the added requirements on immigrants were strongest among self-identified conservatives. In general, conservatives are overwhelmingly opposed to more immigration. For instance, in a separate question in our second round of surveys, only 13% of conservatives wanted legal immigration to be increased, compared to 58% who wanted it reduced. Accordingly, when conservatives weren’t told of the requirements being placed on immigrants, less than 20% of them in both rounds of surveys supported proposals to increase immigration from the Middle East, while 65% or more were opposed.

Strikingly, however, more conservatives supported than opposed these proposals when informed of the integration criteria. In our first round of surveys, conservatives across the nine countries supported additional immigration from the Middle East by 48% to 31% when informed of the job, language, and other requirements that would be placed on the immigrants. Conservatives in the U.S. who were told of the requirements favored the policy by a margin of 43% to 38%.

In the second round, with only the job and welfare requirements, and with “experts” doubting the immigrants would integrate into the host society, conservatives’ support across the five nations surveyed still outstripped conservatives’ opposition, 39% to 37%. Among U.S conservatives, the percentages were substantially more favorable: 49% to 23%. This was an even higher level of support than they showed in the first round, perhaps because of the straightforward emphasis on self-sufficiency—a particular concern of U.S. conservatives—in the second survey.

Given conservatives’ baseline opposition to more immigration, it is remarkable that a plurality of them supported significant increases to immigration from the Middle East when apprised of requirements that the immigrants assimilate culturally and economically. It’s similarly striking that this net support persisted even when the number of these requirements was reduced.

New Ports of Entry for Immigration Politics

Notably, in both sets of surveys, the requirements placed on immigrants were persuasive without adding, for instance, a stipulation that those admitted be highly educated or that there be an offsetting increase in deportation rates. The requirements that immigrants integrate themselves into their new societies sufficed to dramatically bolster support for increasing immigration.

To be sure, persuasion in the real world is not as simple as it is in a public opinion poll. Politicians applying our approach to promote immigration will need to ensure that the public is fully aware of their proposals’ integration requirements and build trust that these requirements will be enforced. After all, opposition to immigration is widespread and susceptible to appeals that call forth differences between “us” and “them.” It is also laden with distrust of government officials seen as soft on border enforcement and on carrying out immigration law.

Nevertheless, our studies indicate that these obstacles are not insurmountable. Prejudice and distrust influence people’s attitudes toward immigration, but they are hardly the only factors citizens are attuned to. People also weigh heavily immigrants’ willingness and ability to integrate into their host society in accordance with liberal values like self-sufficiency and trustworthiness. The West’s political leaders can thus make headway on immigration by addressing their constituents’ primary concern—that newcomers support themselves and otherwise adapt to their adopted homelands.

Fortunately, most immigrants do just this.

© The UnPopulist, 2025

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